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Abstract
The definition of risk introduced in the ISO 31000 standard of 2009 (2018) 
is uncertain goal achievement; thus, both negative and positive outcomes can be 
considered. It also implies that risk is not limited to life and health, but may cover 
all goals of a company. Risk management thus becomes a question of achieving 
and optimizing multiple goals. Since safety is but one of several considerations, 
safety may lose out to other more easily measured objectives of a company, such as 
economics and compliance with regulatory requirements. Risk analyses have a long 
history of quantification, a tradition that for various reasons has waned and should 
be revived if safety goals are to be treated together with other goals of a company. 
The extended scope affects not only company owners and employees but also neigh-
bors, the local community, and the society at large. The stochastic nature of risk and 
the considerable time lap between decisions and the multiattributed consequences 
implies that managing risk is exposed to cognitive biases of many sorts. Risk 
management should be based on a quantitative approach to risk analysis as a protec-
tion against the many cognitive biases likely to be present, and managers should be 
trained to recognize the most common cognitive biases and decision pitfalls.
Keywords: risk management, decision-making, cognitive bias, behavior analysis, 
hazard adaptation
1. Introduction
Accidents happen, in the past and present, and efforts to analyze how to avoid 
their reoccurrence have always been the backbone for improvements in safety. 
Through the study of the causes and statistics of accidents, their frequency and 
consequence severity have been reduced. Analytical algorithms and tools were 
developed, mainly after WW2, supplementing the safety improvements of accident 
investigations. The analytical approach has evolved considerably over the years in 
terms of improvements in methodology and calculation capabilities. The evolu-
tion has also been a response to the extensions in the scope of both risk causes and 
consequences, i.e., goals.
Some of the mathematics and statistics of risk were developed to meet the 
need to decide the average remaining lifetime to estimate the cost of life insur-
ance policies [1]. Practical risk reduction knowledge has accumulated since then 
in high-risk industries like shipping, chemical plants, oil and gas, nuclear power 
plants, aviation, and space exploration. Risk was defined in relation to unwanted 
consequences, as a function of the probability with which an event may happen and 
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how severe it might be (see [2] for an overview). If the causes of risk are known and 
probability data exist, risk can be calculated in quantitative risk analyses (QRAs). 
Making decisions based on the results of risk analyses in a systematic way inspired 
the concept of risk management, with the aim to reduce risk based on findings from 
QRA. The quantitative nature of this approach made cost-benefit analyses possible. 
If properly carried out, the result was a better utilization of limited resources, be it 
money, experts, or other means.
The different applications of risk management in insurance, finance, and 
industry were developed with little mutual exchange between them. The risk 
management tradition of finance looked at risk including both gains and losses 
because of investments, while in industry and engineering, risk was associated with 
potential loss only. Because risk is an expression of events that may happen in the 
future, risk is intrinsically uncertain. The decisions that may trigger such events are 
often made to achieve multiple goals, e.g., profit while maintaining safety margins 
related to health and environment. The question of how to balance several goals is 
not trivial. Some might be in conflict, others might support each other. There can be 
different stakeholders affected by the decision, with different priorities and power 
of influence, and they might be involved directly or indirectly. The stakeholders can 
be owners, employees, neighbors, politicians, NGOs, or competitors. Some goals 
might be certain and others uncertain. Some of the effects of decisions can happen 
in some distant future, raising the issue of discounting. Since humans’ discount is 
differently than “econs,” the rational utility maximizing economic man, the stage 
was set for differences in opinions and priorities. Decision-making in risk manage-
ment is therefore a practical application of judgment under uncertainty, a research 
field developed by Tversky and Kahneman [3, 4] leading to the study of cognitive 
biases and becoming the foundation for behavioral economics [5].
The definition of risk has undergone major changes, from the product of the 
severity and probability of unwanted events to uncertain achievement of multiple 
goals, as reflected in the ISO 31000 “Risk Management,” a guideline developed 
for risk management systems [6]. When the scope is lifted to include the whole 
company and all its objectives, the concept of enterprise risk management (ERM) 
is used. In parallel with the “engineering” approach, the auditing and accounting 
professions have developed an approach to ERM under the COSO label [7] with 
emphasis on fraud prevention and audit of accounting. Comprehensive systems 
on how to reduce risk to an acceptable level on a continuous basis are commonly 
described as Safety Management Systems (SMS), reflecting a broad approach 
including risk analyses, safety assurance, incident investigations, safety inspec-
tions, and audits. In aviation, SMS includes the evaluation of incidents with respect 
to quality the remaining barriers as well as safety issues that may require a more 
detailed risk analysis [8].
Concurrent with the development of SMS, vetting systems have emerged as 
background checks of both people and systems. Vetting is a case-based inspection 
used by a diversity of institutions, from public agencies in border control to oil 
majors in relation to suppliers. When an oil tanker is nominated to a charterer and 
considered for lifting cargo at a terminal which requires the consent of an oil major, 
the oil major will “vet” the vessel, i.e., inspect and approve the vessel for visits to 
that terminal. This is usually regarded as a more critical inspection than the internal 
audits performed by the shipowner because the consequence of a failed vetting is 
a loss of business. SMS and vetting systems complement each other as the former 
is a continuous and systems-based approach, while the latter is more detailed and 
adapted to a practical case.
The different definitions of risk and approaches to mitigate risk may have both 
a positive effect and a negative effect. On the positive side, competition can lead to 
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improvements in achieving results at a lesser cost. Negative effects can be unneces-
sary activities and conflicts between the various safety assurance actors, with more 
bureaucracy and higher costs than necessary. A short history of how risk manage-
ment emerged will be presented before possible improvements in risk management 
are discussed. The focus will be more on the practical and less on the theoretical 
aspects and more on management challenges and less on risk calculation issues.
Deliberate actions to harm, like sabotage and terror, are not covered, although 
some of the considerations made might be of relevance to acts of terrorism as well.
2. A brief history of risk management
2.1 Approaches to risk reduction
Risk causes included in risk analyses have increased in scope; from an initial 
focus on technical failures and extreme environmental conditions via operator 
errors to include problems originating in the culture of organizations and (lack of) 
management commitment. The trend to include a wider causal picture came gradu-
ally during the second half of the last century, motivated by the results of investiga-
tions of some spectacular major accidents, like the Bhopal gas disaster in India in 
1984 [9], the space shuttle accident of Challenger in 1986 [10], and the capsizing 
of the roro ferry “Herald of Free Enterprise” in 1987 [11]. Major accidents also 
occurred in finance, like the bankruptcies of Enron in 2001 and Lehman Brothers 
[12] in 2008, just to mention a few well-known cases. Concurrent with the exten-
sion of the scope of causes, the range of risk consequence has widened and includes 
effects on the environment, social responsibility issues, and company reputation.
The extensions in scopes of both causes and consequences have made risk 
assessment more challenging as methods for quantitative risk analyses have not 
caught up with the increase in scopes. Software tools have made risk management 
easier as far as the “bookkeeping” of risk status and mitigations is concerned. The 
quality of the content of the risk registers is however another question, because 
the extension in scope has come at a cost. The “softer” causes and consequences 
are usually not quantified since cause-effect relations are difficult to identify and 
estimate. Authorities require risk assessments of new endeavors and major changes, 
to be followed up by the industry, although there is shortage on both proper meth-
odologies and qualified analysts. One compromise to this issue was to relax the 
requirement for quantitative results, if not in theory so in practice. QRAs were no 
longer behind the wheel and were moved to the backseat of risk management. The 
lack of numeric rigor in expressions of risk opened a Pandora’s box of more subjec-
tive assessments. The result was a considerable growth in the number of accident 
investigations and risk assessments whose quality is dubious. It is difficult to judge 
whether this development was for the good or the bad, as even a poorly conducted 
qualitative risk analysis could produce interesting findings; at least risk workshops 
made people talk to each other over the border of department silos, thus improving 
in-house communications on risk issues.
Improvements in calculation methods, more powerful computers, and software 
may help to bring QRA back on track by making it possible to apply advanced mod-
eling techniques capturing both stochastic aspects as well as the dynamic properties 
of evolving systems. The systems are “hybrid” in the sense that they consist of both 
technical and human parts, the combination of which raises a principal challenge as 
to how events taking place in the two are to be explained. This is not a new chal-
lenge, as it also was the case with man-machine systems and control room opera-
tors. Physical phenomena are explained through cause-effect relations, as are also 
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human actions, and work well for simple cases. The ability to predict future states 
of physical systems is however reduced when complexity increases, e.g., in forecasts 
of weather. Prediction becomes even harder when the systems contain humans 
supposed to make multiattributed decisions, as in politics and economics [13], and 
one might add, as in risk management.
One remedy is to improve the utilization of knowledge from behavioral and 
cognitive science in the decision-making part of risk management. Behavior science 
is relatively young compared to physics and engineering. It is regarded as “softer” 
in nature and harder to quantify. Of more concern is that the different “schools” 
in the social and human tradition might give an impression of fragmentation, as 
disagreements rage between different professions and disciplines. This situation is 
real, unfortunately, and the main differences are related to what the core subject 
of behavior science should be and how to explain the phenomena studied. The 
approach promoted in this chapter is psychology as a natural science of behavior. 
The explanatory concepts are like those used in evolutionary biology, variation, 
selection, and replicators, to explain fitness in adaptation rather than cause-effect 
relations between the mind and body. Like natural or Darwinian selection explains 
phylogenetic evolution (genetics), so is behavior explained by the selection effects 
of the consequences of behavior during the lifetime of an individual (ontogenetic 
evolution) [14].
In the following, a historic review of how the origin of risk has been investigated 
and understood will be described before possible improvements to the decision-
making part of risk management is discussed.
2.2 Accident investigations
An old saying states that fools never learn and the smart ones learn from their 
own mistakes, while the wise learn from others’ mistakes. In other words, improve-
ment starts with efforts to prevent the unwanted event from occurring again, by 
observation and learning from own or others experience. The key is to identify and 
understand the causes that made the accident happen to prevent it from happen-
ing again. Although this was a reactive approach, over the years the gain was huge. 
Expressions like the anatomy of accidents and unsafe acts were introduced. Earlier, 
once a human error was identified, the analysis was believed to be complete, a 
 misconception that could easily lead to a search for scapegoats. Without an under-
standing of what caused behavior failures, the search for human errors implied to 
find the responsible individual. Often, this was the man at the end of the chain of 
causes, the last contributor before the accident. As situational factors were under-
stood as the main causes of human behavior, unsafe acts were considered the result 
of lack of training, time pressure, man-machine interface design, and other error-
prone situations, and human errors could be reduced if precautions were taken [15].
Investigation boards covering several industries were established as national 
agencies in many countries. Accident causes were categorized as independent or 
contingent on other events, and as the physics of accidents were better understood, 
the logical relations between the events, their timing, and sequence leading up to 
the accident could be described more accurately. Unsafe acts no longer were the 
sole precursor to accidents, and a more complete causal picture appeared. When a 
human error was identified that had contributed to an accident, that signaled the 
start of the analysis, not the end. The chain of causes was further expanded when 
the investigation moved away from the immediate proximity to the operator and to 
the functions of the organization, management, owners, and the way the regulatory 
authorities operated. This extension of the causal scope was undoubtful of value, 
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as people higher up in the organizational hierarchy could influence risk much more 
than the person at the sharp end of the line.
The change in focus from those executing operations to the designers and plan-
ners in management reflects the advance in technology which was about to change 
the primary human role in work life from manual labor to planning and decision-
making. Management, organization, and culture were firmly included as topics to 
be addressed in accident investigations in most countries by the turn of the century. 
Aviation can serve as an example of successful accident investigation history. Flight 
anomalies and pilot error reporting are mandatory for both airliners and ground 
control. The pilots and air traffic controllers filing incident reports are not subject 
to legal prosecution unless there is a case of deliberate and serious misconduct. The 
fact that air flights are possibly the safest transportation means of all when expo-
sure is measured per unit of distance and not per time unit is largely due to lessons 
learned from nonpunitive reporting systems and findings from thorough accident 
investigation efforts.
2.3 Technical risk
As accident investigation was established as the primary way of enhancing 
safety, accident causes were initially understood to be technical and human failures. 
Improvement both in the reliability of components and in how they were combined 
in systems resulted in fewer accidents. As reliability theory and calculation meth-
ods and tools became available to the engineering community after WW2, QRA 
methods were developed [16]. Techniques of a more qualitative nature were also 
developed, like failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard and operability 
analysis (HAZOP), and various barrier analyses. These new proactive analytical 
tools made it possible to improve safety before accidents happened and proved to be 
an important complement to reactive techniques like investigations of accidents and 
incidents.
The Reactor Safety Study [17] was probably the first “total” quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA), also called the Rasmussen report or WASH-1400. The report was 
published in 1974 after 3 years of work involving more than 50 contractors at a 
cost of about 4 million USD, equivalent to about 30 million today. The analysis 
was based on a system reliability approach, where component failure rates were 
combined using Boolean logic, represented graphically as logical gates in fault trees. 
The objective of the WASH-1400 study was to calculate a realistic estimate of the 
risk posed by nuclear power plants as a response to public claims that this new way 
of producing energy was very dangerous. The study concluded that it was about 1 
million times more likely that car driving would be fatal. The study was criticized, 
partly because the nuclear risk was calculated, while the comparative risks, e.g., 
from traffic accidents, was based on statistics of real events [18]. The most influen-
tial result of WASH-1400 study was that it served as a recipe for similar analyses in 
other industries, e.g., the offshore oil and gas exploration in the North Sea.
One main reason for the early popularity of risk analyses was that the fault and 
event tree modeling approach was scalable to any plant type and size, if design 
drawings, P&ID, and component failure rates were available. The QRA made it 
possible to include the human as a system component that could fail, like a valve, 
a pump, or a vessel. In this way, the stage was set for the development of human 
reliability assessment methods that could feed human error probability data into 
the system reliability models.
The practice of applying risk analysis methods spread to other sectors and 
industries. Environmental impact studies were prepared built on the same logic. 
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Consequence assessments were required before approval of large-scale industry and 
real estate development projects. Some years passed, however, before risk analyses 
became a required part of safety work in aviation. One probable reason for this late 
start is that accident and incident investigations had become quite advanced and 
were used to a large extent in aviation, providing ample evidence for their positive 
contributions to flight safety. As the saying goes, don’t change a winning team. The 
various safety methods are however better considered as elements of a broader 
safety effort, each contributing in their own way to improvements. Risk-based SMS 
are now mandatory for airliners, airport providers, and air traffic control service 
providers.
2.4 Human risk
Because the systems that failed also needed humans for operation, maintenance, 
and repair, human reliability became part of QRA. Assessment methods for human 
reliability for industrial and defense applications with high potential for major 
accidents were developed. One early example is control room operations in nuclear 
power plants [19]. Human tasks and their error probabilities were modeled using 
event trees like THERP, and tables of human error probabilities were published in a 
handbook for use in risk analyses [20]. Human errors could be omissions or com-
missions, meaning that something was forgotten or a wrong act was carried out. 
Later versions of human reliability models stated human error probabilities as a 
function of performance shaping factors (PSFs). The models were calibrated using 
data from experiments, statistics, and expert judgments. Examples of PSFs are 
quality of the man-machine interface, violation of stereotypes, too high or too low 
stress level, isolated acts, conflict of motives, quality of feedback, etc. [21, 22]. The 
human error models were mainly motoric tasks or simple decisions related to the 
execution of the tasks.
Safety research programs were nurtured by the growth in the British and 
Norwegian oil and gas offshore activities. In Norway, an increase in safety funding 
became available after the Aleksander Kielland accident in 1980 where a capsized 
floatel resulted in 123 fatalities. The Piper Alpha accident on the British sector in 
1988 also served as a boost for increased safety efforts, resulting in the safety case 
approach [23]. The state safety funding in Norway was mainly devoted to occu-
pational safety, workplace democracy, and socio-technical issues, while means to 
develop human reliability lessened. This was possibly due to pressure from labor 
unions who exerted considerable influence on the governmental financing of safety 
research. The focus on the worker as a contributing factor to risk was not politically 
acceptable, even though situational factors or PSFs were modeled as human error 
causes. When empirically based failure rate repositories were developed [24], and 
human error was included in the equipment failure rates, the need for human reli-
ability data vanished, and the human reliability profession was history. In Britain 
the situation was better due to the larger industrial sector and cooperation between 
industry, universities, and consultancies [25].
The way humans contribute to risk ranges from simple motoric tasks to com-
plicated decisions that include other people and other institutions. The former was 
developed quantitatively as human reliability, while the latter, decision failures, 
have so far not been formally included in QRA to this author’s knowledge. Decision 
errors have however been extensively studied by behavior science in the cognitive 
bias tradition. The absence of an analysis of decision failures in risk management is 
probably related to lack of empirical data, the high complexity of decisions under 
risk, and the shortcomings of behavior science in this area. Decision behavior is 
by no means understood sufficiently, although progress during the last couple of 
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decades has been significant, as exemplified by cognitive bias research and the 
policy relevant “nudge” tradition [26]. Machine learning, Bayesian network, and 
self-learning AI robots are promising research disciplines. For now, a closer look at a 
few cognitive biases relevant for risk management will have to suffice.
2.5 Financial risk
Economics is probably the field of human endeavor that has been most con-
cerned with risk, covering uncertain outcomes of both positive and negative values. 
New challenges appear as robots and artificial intelligence (AI) are being applied 
in finance and trading of stocks and derivatives. It is interesting to observe that AI 
algorithms use operant selection in AI self-learning, adaptive systems. The rapid 
innovation is a challenge for regulations because regulatory requirements usually 
are lagging new technology.
Angner defines economics as “the manner in which people make choices under 
conditions of scarcity and the results of those choices for society at large” [27]. 
In Anger’s textbook Adam Smith is considered the founder of modern economics 
and author of influential books like The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. Smith regarded the economy as a self-regulating system where the price 
mechanism would balance the supply and demand and thus result in the best alloca-
tion of scarce resources, aided by competition in the market and humans driven by 
self-interest. The self-governing system would reduce the need for a supreme regu-
latory power, being it the state or the church. The idea that liberty and individual 
freedom with a minimum of regulation would lead to prosperous outcomes for all 
members of society can be traced back to the Age of Enlightenment, a movement in 
Europe during the eighteenth century essential for the opposition against religious 
and feudal governing of people and commerce. The core of the economic system 
was the rational, utility-maximizing economic agent or “econ,” whose behavior 
was considered both as normative and descriptive. These assumptions were to be 
criticized from political and behavioral points of view, respectively.
The economic liberty and individual freedom resulted in a much higher produc-
tivity and thus accumulation of wealth, but not for all. The politically based critique 
of the self-regulating economy leading to prosperity was based on the resulting 
skewed distribution of the new wealth. This controversy still exists and fuels 
the conflict between capitalist and socialist ideas on governance of a society and 
attitudes to market economy.
The critique from the behavioral side was based on research showing that most 
people did in fact not behave like “econs.” An important contribution to under-
standing how decisions were made beyond the rational-agent concept was the work 
of Herbert Simon [28] on bounded rationality. When the article “Heuristics and 
Biases” by Tversky and Kahneman [3] was published in Science, human decision 
failures defined as deviations from the choices of an econ became a prime subject of 
psychological experiments. Prospect theory was published in Econometrica [29] by 
the same two authors a few years later, formalizing the basis for cognitive decision 
research. Although the lack of a clear definition of a “bias” was pointed out [30], the 
research on cognitive bias and heuristics flourished. The impact reached far beyond 
the field of psychology, as the empirical foundations of neoclassical economics 
came under attack (see Thaler [5] for a historic overview of the emerging field of 
behavioral economics). The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was given 
to Simon in 1978, to Kahneman in 2002, and to Thaler in 2017 as a recognition of 
their contributions.
That the assumption of the rational agent, economic man or “econ” for short, 
was disputed did not imply that the rationality of economics as such was rejected. 
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Economic man was assumed to be the normative case of how decisions should be 
made if the goal was to maximize outcome for the decision-maker. The prescription 
fits the stereotype of an omniscient business executive doing transactions in a com-
mercially competitive society. It is unclear why leading economists proposed the 
rational utility-maximizing agent as a generic, descriptive model for human deci-
sion behavior, thus confusing the descriptive with the normative. One reason could 
be to strengthen the legitimacy of economics as a science based on rational humans, 
to be backed further by the most rational scientific discipline of all, mathematics. 
Another reason for the misperception of normative and descriptive could be the 
lack of interest shown by psychologists, including behavior analysts, in decision-
making in business and industry. The “invasion of economists” into the land of the 
social and behavior sciences might explain some of the skepticism toward econo-
mists from behavior scientists. The resentment between the two disciplines might 
have been strengthened because economists are preferred as managers and admin-
istrators, especially in the commercial private sector, and few with a background in 
behavior science seek such employments or are preferred as candidates.
The Enron case has been portrayed as an example of a major financial risk and 
an example of willful corporate fraud and corruption, and it led to the dissolu-
tion of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm. The various financial disasters that 
followed were probably not committed conscientiously, as the human’s capabil-
ity to self-justification seems limitless. The Enron case was a major motivation 
for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, leading to much stricter accounting rules. 
Paradoxically enough, it also led to a burst in the business of accounting companies 
who then later was delivering the services needed for companies to comply with 
the new rules. A better alternative would have been to introduce quantitative risk 
management methodologies developed in the engineering domain, and adapted 
that to finance, rather than to enforce stricter auditing philosophies that so far had 
been proven insufficient. The mitigation of finance risk has therefore proceeded 
more as a kind of compliance management rather than risk management.
2.6 Organizational risk
The change in production technology from manual labor, via mechanization 
to automation, resulted in more management type of activities like designing, 
planning, and decision-making. As a reflection of this development, a sociologi-
cal perspective on risk was introduced to explain why accidents occurred [31]. 
Concepts like “normal accidents,” “an accident waiting to happen,” “tightly coupled 
systems,” and “interactive complexity” were introduced to describe the vulnerabili-
ties of high-risk companies. This new understanding was first applied in accident 
investigations, and the stage was set for a search for causes to risk in the way the 
organization, i.e., management, was prepared for, or rather was not prepared for, 
safety. There is however little agreement on how an organization should look like 
for operations to be safe. Studies of the so-called high reliability organizations 
(HRO) might give an indication [32], but their way of conducting operations would 
hardly be accepted as role models for the industry in general.
The Swiss cheese metaphor was introduced to illustrate defense in depth [33] 
and is a visual representation of how barriers can fail simultaneously, visualized 
as slices of cheese with holes that are lined up. This was a failure situation that for 
decades had been modeled in reliability engineering by fault trees with the more 
precise Boolean and gates. The sociological perspective got a strong foothold in acci-
dent investigations but did never make it to the QRA teams other than to visualize 
and illustrate. A new metaphor is not necessarily an improvement, especially not 
when attention is diverted from logics and calculation. The sociological perspective 
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on accidents reinforced a qualitative approach to the study of organizational risk 
causes.
As far as the human contribution to risk is concerned, the change resulted in a 
move in responsibility from the operator to management and owners. The socio-
logical view on causes to accidents, helped by the auditing focus on compliance with 
regulations, could non-intentionally lead to the blame and shame culture being 
lifted from the shop floor to the board room.
The sociological perspective on risk came with a political flavor as manage-
ment could be considered as potential culprits causing accidents. It put the focus 
on commercial pressure, reduced manning, budget cuts, insufficient training, 
and if management failed as role models for safety, by paying lip service to safety 
priorities while acting otherwise. Not walking the talk was a sure trail leading to a 
depraved safety culture. This critical attitude toward private enterprise and busi-
ness is understandable given the safety scandals of the time, as the case of the Pinto 
can exemplify.
3. Risk management improvements
The story of the Ford Pinto illustrates two interesting issues of relevance to risk 
management and decision-making. The first issue is the low priority given to safety 
at the time, and the second one is how animosity toward setting a monetary value 
on life can hamper safety improvements. The priority issue has been rectified as 
safety is now given a much higher importance, partly because of negative press 
coverage and lawsuit compensations. The last issue is related to a reluctance to set a 
monetary value on life and is still controversial. These two issues need some expla-
nations to bring home. It should be noted that the presentation given in the follow-
ing is based on the report prepared by the Mother Jones magazine [34].
3.1 The issue of safety priority
During the 1960s the American car industry was met with fierce competition 
from European and Japanese manufacturers who were targeting the lucrative 
small-car market. The response from the Ford Motor company was the Pinto, a 
subcompact car that was put into production at record time. This was achieved 
by concurrency in engineering design and production of assembly line tools. The 
consequence was that design changes would be costly if they required any change 
in manufacturing tools. As the first cars were manufactured, collision tests revealed 
a serious safety issue related to the position of the fuel tank. It would easily burst 
by the impact from a rear-end collision, even at low speed. The car would be 
engulfed in flames if the gasoline was ignited, which was likely to happen because 
the impact itself would produce sparks. Another safety flaw was that the doors 
would be jammed at a moderate collision speed, rendering escape impossible. Ford 
management knew about the design flaws, but nothing was done about it although 
cheap measures were possible. Safety was not given priority, and money was rather 
spent on lobbying against safety regulations that were being prepared for the auto 
manufacturers. More than half a million cars were produced each year, making a 
huge profit for the Ford company. The number of rear-end collision fatalities has 
been estimated to be in the range of 500–900 during the 8 years before Ford finally 
incorporated safety improvements.
The many fire accidents caught the interest of the Mother Jones magazine. 
Several hundred reports and documents regarding rear-end collisions were studied, 
including the tests made by the company itself. It was also revealed that an internal 
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memo sent to senior management had compared the cost of redesign of the hazard-
ous position of the fuel tank with the off-court settlement cost of humans that 
would suffer from accidents. Applying the value of life provided by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [35], the memo concluded that 
Ford would save almost $70 million by allowing accidents to occur. Mother Jones 
published the story in their August 1977 issue, and the reaction was devastating. 
Criminal charges and lawsuits were made, all Pintos were recalled, and the Ford 
Motor company got some of the worst press an American car manufacturer has ever 
received.
Although traffic safety had improved over many years [36], it was the investiga-
tive journalism by the Mother Jones magazine, and the following attention of the 
press in general, that made a whole industry set higher priority on safety.
3.2 The issue of the value of life
A cost-benefit analysis applied in the management of safety risk will require a 
monetary value of human life. The benefit from improved safety is calculated as 
fatalities and injuries avoided. The costs are mainly due to the mitigative measures 
and production loss needed for the implementation of the measures. A QRA 
estimating the risk reduction effect of the mitigation may provide the benefit value, 
if the values of life and health are given. This way of thinking is considered cynical 
and calculating by some people. Not doing cost-benefit calculations is for quantita-
tive risk analysts equal to missing the opportunity to save lives.
Safety competes with all other objectives of a company, and the easiest to 
calculate are economics, production logistics, and marketing. Management must be 
convinced to initiate safety measures for unacceptable risks. The most cost-effective 
mitigation measures can be identified if a QRA is prepared. The CEO of a company 
has usually no training in safety and QRA methods, and neither has any of the other 
directors nor vice presidents.
The Pinto story is not unique, and the car manufacturing industry might not be 
the worst. A possible side effect of the media focus and lawsuits to track down the 
responsible individuals or company can have strengthened a reluctance to apply risk 
analyses to improve safety, because it is always possible that no-cure-no-pay lawyers 
could use the results in future lawsuits. A verdict in disfavor of a company is more 
likely if there is a reason to believe that the risks were known by management, even 
if being at acceptable levels.
It is likely that the Pinto and other cases that made the headlines prepared the 
ground for the introduction of the concept of the “amoral calculator company,” 
which is a way to describe different types of business firms on how they would 
respond to safety regulation and enforcement [37]. The amoral calculator type of 
companies and management was assumed to be mainly driven by self-interest and 
profit maximization, assuming they calculated costs and benefits in relation to 
safety measures to see what they could get away with. An ill-fated consequence of 
this kind of thinking is that doing cost-benefit calculation of safety measures by 
itself could be considered an amoral act. This is detrimental to safety because it will 
make the identification of the most cost-effective safety measures difficult.
4. Behavior analysis and risk management
Simply stated, risk management implies making decisions to influence risk 
in a predicted and controlled way. The expression above rests on the following 
criteria: knowledge about the risk level and safety margins are available, and the 
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decision-makers are trained to observe and obey the risk acceptance limits. There 
are however several reasons why this may not happen: first, QRAs may not be 
carried out, so there is no reference, i.e., no quantitative measure of the current risk 
or trend. Second, risk acceptance limits are not defined, so if the risk was known, 
there is no knowledge of it being too high. Third, decision-makers are not trained to 
observe and act based on trends in the risk level, relative to risk acceptance limits. 
And finally, human decision behavior is vulnerable to a range of cognitive biases 
involving thinking and emotions. Failures to meet the assumptions above can 
result in a faulty risk management process. The most relevant cognitive biases for 
decision-making in risk management will be described in the following.
4.1 The base rate neglect and exposure
One of the best known cognitive biases is base rate neglect [3] which occurs 
when background information is disregarded and the decision is based on super-
ficial and less relevant information. Risk is expressed relative to exposure, like the 
number of events or incidents divided by the number of opportunities for incidents 
to happen. When catchy and stereotypical descriptions dominate or replace base 
rates, decisions may be based on deceptive heuristics reflecting these stereotypes. 
The base rate neglect bias is especially relevant to qualitative risk estimations 
because this type of risk analysis does not require quantitative exposure data. 
The result can be hazard adaptation, an unnoticed slide toward a more lenient 
risk acceptance behavior. Prior to the faulty decision to launch the space shuttle 
Challenger in January 1986, the decision process failed on several of the criteria 
mentioned above. The outcome was the loss of the shuttle and the lives of seven 
crew members. Better knowledge of QRA and cognitive biases in decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty might have changed the fatal decision and avoided the 
accident [38].
4.2 The optimism bias and variation
The optimism bias can be described as a general overestimation of our per-
formance in our favor. In a review of biases [39], it was concluded that optimistic 
illusions are the only group of misbeliefs that might be adaptive. The optimism bias 
is associated with harder and longer work periods, which may account for higher 
pay and promotions [40]. The optimism bias is also associated with an optimistic 
view of future events and an increased will, and thus ability, to predict and control 
future outcomes. In the inverse situation, as when prediction and control is not 
possible, the result is reduced ability to learn. The term “learned helplessness” was 
coined by Seligman to account for these effects [41].
The optimism bias or overconfidence is probably one of the most common and 
strongest human fallacies [42]. The bias is found in many different countries and 
cultures. Examples of the optimism bias are that we engage in more new ventures, 
establish new relationships, buy lottery tickets, etc., in areas where the expected 
benefit is much lower than the effort invested [43]. Many new businesses would 
probably not have been started and inventions not made, unless the effort required 
was underestimated. Many more activities are started than a realistic and rational 
utility-maximizing agent would initiate, making the optimism bias the mother of 
variation and innovation.
Translated into evolutionary terms, the optimism bias fuels the variation upon 
which selection operates. This is probably the case for both types of evolution: 
phylogenetic as in genetic inheritance and ontogenetic as when operant behavior is 
selected by the consequence it produces.
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Overconfidence is rampant; we are all susceptible to it, and particularly in skills 
we do not master well. A large majority of drivers (above 90%) believe that they are 
better than the average driver [44]. The Dunning-Kruger experiments indicate that 
the less we excel in something, the more confident “experts” we tend to believe we 
are [45]. Training and education might however help, as the experiments indicate 
that high competence reduces neglect and overconfidence.
The optimism bias may account for the frequent lack of realism in project 
planning and budgeting, in addition to other more tactical causes like securing 
the approval of a project by promising too much. They provide good arguments 
for applying quantitative project risk analysis, an application of QRA to proj-
ects. Realistic means for time and money should be calculated before a project is 
launched, with defined confidence limits. The assurance arrangement for public 
projects above 750 million NOK issued by the Norwegian Finance Department 
around the turn of the last century [46] is an example.
4.3 The confirmation bias and selection
People tend to come up with a hypothesis and then to find support for it, instead 
of trying to prove it wrong. When we are sufficiently confident about our presump-
tion through confirming, we stop searching even though there could be better 
alternatives. The presumptions can be beliefs and rules for conduct of the form “if 
you do this under those conditions, the result will be such and such.” Or they can be 
of simpler form, like stereotypes or weak correlations. Rules do not always produce 
the expected result. In behavioral terms, they are maintained on an intermittent or 
partial reinforcement schedule.
The confirmation bias may lead to the following of premature and false rules. 
Confirmation behavior also has positive effects as it serves to stabilize conduct and 
makes us more predictable, enhancing social acceptability. This is good if the rules 
are good. The downside is that one also becomes a reliable follower of rules that are 
not optimal and sometimes disadvantageous. Conformity and lack of innovation 
may be a high price to pay for social and political acceptance.
The Behavioral Insights Team (BIT), partly owned by the UK government, 
has identified the confirmation bias as one of the most prominent barriers against 
learning new skills and innovation [47]. In a recent study, the news consumption 
pattern of 376 million Facebook users was analyzed, showing that most users pre-
ferred to get their news from a small number of sources they already agreed with, 
further bolstering existing beliefs and preventing new insights [48].
4.4 Cognitive dissonance contingencies
Cognitive dissonance was introduced as an explanation of choice behavior in a 
situation of ambiguity [49] and is an example of an activity where both respondent 
and operant behaviors are present. The influence of affect in decision-making can 
be very significant [50]. One example of a bias is the “halo effect” that may occur 
when strong positive reactions are reflected over (conditioned) to otherwise neutral 
stimuli, an effect of stimulus generalization in classical conditioning. The opposite 
reaction is called the “horn effect.” One aspect of emotional reactions is that they 
tend to be either positive or negative, experienced as pleasure or pain, broadly 
stated. When there is correspondence between, e.g., our belief and what we per-
ceive, i.e., confirmation, there is a feeling of pleasure. When there is a discrepancy 
of some sort, the feeling is aversive.
In behavioral terms, and somewhat simplified, we might say that cognitive 
consonance, i.e., confirmation, produces behavior that is positively reinforced, 
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while dissonance produces behavior that is under aversive control, resulting in 
either escape or avoidance behavior. Repeated instances of a response that effec-
tively terminates a dissonance may become an automated avoidance response. A 
similar argument can be stated regarding consonance; it keeps behavior on a steady 
course. Automated behavior escapes our attention, and we do not notice neither 
the dissonance nor the consonance. Automated decision behavior on “autopilot” is 
energy efficient as deliberate considerations are not carried out. The result might be 
a failure to notice changes that should have induced another decision outcome.
If strong conflicting emotions and values are involved, cognitive dissonance 
behavior is difficult to modify [51], in particular if there are automated reactions 
involved. Accusations of being biased may strengthen the aversive emotion, as it 
moves the attention from the outcome of the decision to the person making the 
decision. Attribution to a person often leads to reactions of defense in the form of 
self-justification, and the behavior might become extremely resistant to change 
[52]. The defense behaviors have become automated avoidance behavior, either 
as self-justification, as counterattack of some form, or a combination of the two. 
Automated behavior is not reflected upon; it is subconscious. Automated self-
justification includes self-illusions or blind spots for everybody to notice except the 
self-justifier himself [53], a favorite subject in many comedies.
To favor beliefs that are not falsifiable is a powerful form of defense against cog-
nitive dissonance as it will protect against being proven wrong, which is an unpleas-
ant experience for most people. Confirmation behavior may be maintained by both 
negative and positive reinforcements. An individual might have a confirmation 
behavior that is simultaneously maintained as avoidance/escape behavior and as 
positively reinforced gratification-seeking behavior (ref. the Pollyanna principle). 
Multiple contingencies might explain why confirmation behavior is a very strong 
default option and why falsification is so rare as a belief-testing strategy in daily life 
as well as in making risk management decisions.
4.5 The power of inadequate rules
Behavior maintained on a thin reinforcement schedule is more resistant to 
extinction and change than behavior that has been reinforced according to a con-
tinuous schedule [54], a phenomenon called the partial reinforcement extinction 
effect.
Rare confirmation of rules or beliefs implies that the following of such rules 
is maintained on an intermittent or partial reinforcement schedule. The result is 
that vaguely formulated rules and beliefs as are typical for qualitative risk analyses 
often are more resistant to change than rules that are more precise and correctly 
formulated. Unclear and rarely confirmed beliefs tend to have more dedicated and 
convinced followers than rules and beliefs that reflect reality more precisely. It is 
a paradox that, at least within certain limits, the less correct a belief is, the more 
convinced the believers are.
A similar phenomenon is observed in the Dunning-Kruger effect commented 
earlier, if less skilled implies have beliefs that are less correct and adequate than 
more skilled individuals. The Dunning-Kruger effect states that low-competence 
individuals tend to believe that their ability is higher than it really is. High-
competence individuals have a more realistic view and may even slightly underesti-
mate their performance. The authors comment that when people are incompetent in 
their strategies to achieve success, they suffer a dual burden: not only do they reach 
erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but also their incompetence 
robs them of the ability to realize it. Instead, they are left with the mistaken impres-
sion that they are doing just fine. This is also an example of the blind spot bias. As 
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it is said: “First rule of the Dunning-Kruger Club: You do not know you’re in the 
Dunning-Kruger Club.” This statement is unfortunately valid for most biases, as 
being aware of a bias does not protect you from being biased.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, a short history of risk management was presented before the 
most prominent cognitive biases were discussed. Due to their evolutionary past, 
they are natural to our behavior repertoire and difficult to change and avoid. To 
make choices under uncertainty constitutes an error-prone situation typical for 
risk management decisions that are influenced by both our phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic histories. The two learning processes have hugely different timescales 
and mechanisms of fitness for variation and selection. Comparing the two is like 
relating the elephant with the man sitting on the back of the elephant. They are 
both better off if they cooperate, in other words: how shall we minimize the nega-
tive effects of cognitive biases and how to utilize the positive effects of cognitions, 
i.e., thinking and verbal behavior, man’s most precious virtues? The evolution of 
language and thinking gave man a crystal ball enabling imagination of a future 
that also contain age-related sickness, decline of physical and mental abilities, and 
inevitable death. Without the optimism bias, the evolution of mankind might have 
stopped when humanoids reached the stage of language and abstract thinking. 
Overconfidence is essential for innovation as it induces variation for selection to 
work on. Some of it ends in budget overruns, delays, and products that never make 
it to the market. The crucial question is to keep the “good” and avoid the “bad” 
variation and selection. How to balance these must be situation specific as there is 
a large difference between risk management in aviation and risk management in 
the development of digital consumer products. Flight safety leaves little room for 
variation, while digital gadgets must get to the market first with the new innovative 
product. Then, it is ok to fail given that you now and then hit a blockbuster. The 
market does the selection; the employees and management must secure sufficient 
variation, biased or not.
Confirmation behavior usually serves us well as it stabilizes conduct and makes 
it easier for others to predict our behavior, which is beneficial for building social 
relations. It also boosts self-confidence, because we perceive ourselves as more con-
sistent and coherent than we actually are. Repeated often enough, the confirmation 
behavior can be automated, making us unaware of it. And when our behavior for 
whatever reason becomes inconsistent, as viewed by other people or by ourselves, 
the dissonance leaves us with an unpleasant feeling we seek to escape. We usually 
succeed, due to a well-equipped escape and avoidance behavior repertoire, devel-
oped over many years of our upbringing.
If the confirmation or avoidance behavior is maintained on a partial reinforce-
ment schedule, it can become very resistant to change. The thinner the schedule, 
the more resistant the behavior is likely to become; within certain limits. Beliefs or 
rules that are less correct are confirmed more seldom than more correct beliefs. This 
opens for a subconscious and callous effect; the more wrong you are, the stronger 
you believe you are correct. In the discourse of science, falsification has therefore 
been proposed as the preferred scientific method for verification rather than 
confirmation [55].
Cognitive biases are human legacies from our behavioral past that may strongly 
influence decision-making in risk management. The research on these items is only 
in its infancy. That should however not prevent us from considering what we can do 
today, although we should be modest in what it is possible to achieve. The resistance 
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to change and stealth like character of cognitive biases make them almost impos-
sible to avoid. It is however possible to reduce their effect to some degree by rein-
stating QRA as the basis for risk management, extended with a review of relevant 
cognitive biases. The not-so-surprising solution is to let only well-qualified people 
take management positions. This might constitute a challenge as there normally are 
many to choose from. The best qualified are not necessarily those with highest self-
confidence. It is rather the opposite, as the Dunning-Kruger experiments indicate. 
The less skilled people tend to unknowingly exaggerate their abilities. They are 
probably not the people you would like to make crucial decisions regarding risk, but 
you are likely to find them overrepresented among wannabe managers.
Regardless of industry, effective risk management implies that regulations must 
be in place that require QRA of high quality, and if risk levels are not acceptable, 
the measures that are most cost-effective must be identified and implemented, 
until the risk is within acceptable limits. This is the essence of a risk management 
system. If any of the steps are missing or carried out without the proper knowledge, 
compensation to those who suffered from the accident can be enforced. Using 
lawyers to promote safety by making the responsible pay compensation for damage 
is an example of corrective action; it is reactive as it is initiated after the accident 
has occurred. Accident prevention is however a much better strategy than damage 
compensation. A proactive way to promote safety is to set a much higher value on 
life. This policy should be made external to the involved stakeholders, e.g., by an 
official, public institution like NHTSA for road safety. A still better solution is to 
raise the decision of value of life above the different industry branches, as there is 
no good reason why the value of life should depend on what kind of work you do.
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